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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











BROOKS RANGE CONTRACT SERVICES, INC. 
______________ 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 2:11-cv-07269) 
District Judge: Hon. R. Barclay Surrick 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 16, 2015 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR., and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges.
 







SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Antonio Santiago appeals the District Court’s order granting summary judgment in 
favor of Brooks Range Contract Services, Inc. (“BRCS”) on his age and race 
discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
621 et seq. (“ADEA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et 
seq. (“Title VII”), and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 951 
et seq. (“PHRA”).  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
I 
 Santiago, a Hispanic male in his seventies, worked for U.S. Facilities, Inc. 
(“USF”) as an Environmental Control Center (“ECC”) operator at the Social Security 
Administration (“SSA”) building in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, beginning in 1985.  
BRCS won a bid to replace USF as the facilities manager for the SSA building beginning 
on February 1, 2010.  BRCS hired its employees from USF’s work force.  As part of the 
hiring process, Howard Anastasi, BRCS’s Director of Human Resources, sought input 
about USF employees from Brian Gougler, Santiago’s supervisor, and Francis Casey, an 
ECC operating engineer.  Gougler and Casey told Anastasi that there had been 
“problems” with Santiago, App. 193-95, and Casey specifically told him that Santiago 
struggled with the computer systems and on one occasion fell asleep while on duty. 
 Anastasi testified that Casey’s input did “[n]ot really” have an impact on his 
decision not to hire Santiago, App. 194, though it solidified his decision “[a] little bit,” 
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App. 195.1  Anastasi testified that his decision was based in part on an incident that 
occurred at the building in January 2010.  Anastasi, who was present but did not actually 
see what caused the incident, testified that there was “chaos,” App. 194, and that he 
overheard a “number of people” say that Santiago was responsible because he 
“overlook[ed] alarms in the ECC,” App. 193.  According to Anastasi, the incident 
“generated a great deal of concern” and made the SSA very upset.  App. 194.  Shortly 
thereafter, Gougler informed Santiago that BRCS was not going to hire him due to “poor 
performance.”  App. 172.   
 Santiago sued BRCS, alleging that it refused to hire him because of his age and 
race, in violation of the ADEA, Title VII, and the PHRA.  In response, BRCS stated that 
Santiago was not hired because Rich Finocchio, the manager of the SSA building, 
informed Anastasi that Santiago had not mastered the fire alarm system, had been 
observed sleeping on the job, and had required frequent assistance, and because of the 
January 2010 incident.2  The District Court concluded that, although Santiago had 
                                                 
1 Zach Jones, Santiago’s immediate supervisor, testified that he heard Casey make 
derogatory remarks and jokes about certain ethnicities, and on more than one occasion 
refer to “people of a Spanish background” as “spics,” App. 220, but that these comments 
were not directed at Santiago.  Jones further testified that he occasionally had 
disagreements with Casey about the employees Jones hired.  In particular, Jones recalled 
that Casey was displeased with his decision to hire Orlando Rivera, a Hispanic EEC 
operator.  Although Casey asked Jones why he hired Rivera, whom Casey referred to as 
“the Spanish guy,” Casey’s inquiry focused not on Rivera’s ethnicity but rather on why 
one of Casey’s associates was not hired instead.  App. 219.  
2 Santiago testified that he had not fallen asleep on the job or made errors related 
to the fire alarm system, and Jones described Santiago as “somewhere between [a] good 
and model employee.”  App. 210.   
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established a prima facie case for age and race discrimination, he did not show that 
BRCS’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not hiring him were pretext, and 
granted BRCS’s motion for summary judgment.  Santiago appeals. 
II3 
A 
 Santiago seeks relief under the ADEA, Title VII, and the PHRA.  The analytical 
framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), 
applies to all three statutes.  See Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996).  
Under the McDonnell Douglas three-step test, the plaintiff must first establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination.  Id.  Second, “[o]nce the plaintiff establishes a prima facie 
case, ‘the burden then . . . shift[s] to the employer to articulate some legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.’”  Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 
151, 157 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).  Third, if the 
employer meets its burden, “[t]he plaintiff then must establish by a preponderance of the 
                                                 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the grant of summary judgment is 
plenary.  Mylan Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 723 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2013).  
We apply the same standard as the District Court, viewing facts and making reasonable 
inferences in the non-movant’s favor.  Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 
265, 266-67 (3d Cir. 2005).  Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “An issue is genuine only if there is a sufficient 
evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and a 
factual dispute is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing 
law.”  Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).  
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evidence that the employer’s proffered reasons were merely a pretext for discrimination, 
and not the real motivation for the unfavorable job action.”  Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003).  “[T]hroughout this burden-shifting paradigm[,] the 
ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination always rests with the plaintiff.”  
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994). 
  BRCS does not dispute that Santiago established a prima facie case of age and 
race discrimination, and Santiago concedes that BRCS articulated legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for not hiring him.  Thus, “[t]he sole issue of contention in this 
appeal . . . is whether [Santiago] has succeeded in creating an issue of fact as to whether 
[BRCS’s] proffered non-discriminatory reasons for [not hiring him] are a pretext.”  Kautz 
v. Met-Pro Corp., 412 F.3d 463, 466-67 (3d Cir. 2005).  To show pretext, the employee 
“must point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could 
reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) 
believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or 
determinative cause of the employer’s action.”  Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 
427 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The employee “must 
show[] not merely that the employer’s proffered reason was wrong, but that it was so 
plainly wrong that it cannot have been the employer’s real reason.”  Keller v. Orix Credit 
Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc).  
 Santiago argues that BRCS’s reasons for not hiring him are pretext because: (1) 
his alleged job performance issues are unsupported by documentation; (2) the reasons are 
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“conflicting,” in that Finocchio was not named in Anastasi’s deposition testimony, 
Appellant Br. 18; (3) Anastasi never actually observed Santiago in connection with the 
emergency incident; (4) the negative job performance reviews are inconsistent with 
Jones’s favorable testimony about Santiago’s abilities; (5) he is significantly older than 
many of the USF EEC employees who BRCS retained; and (6) he was replaced by a 
white EEC operator, and only white EEC operators were promoted to managerial 
positions. 
 These arguments are unavailing.  First, the absence of documentation about 
Santiago’s job performance issues is not a barrier to summary judgment, particularly 
where, as here, USF’s personnel files were not made available to BRCS.  See Brewer v. 
Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that while an 
employer’s inability to produce a relevant document permits a negative inference, “[f]or 
the rule to apply, it is essential that the evidence in question be within the [employer’s] 
control”). 
 Second, BRCS’s reasons for not hiring Santiago have not changed.  Santiago was 
informed in January 2010 that BRCS was not going to hire him because of performance 
issues, and in its interrogatories, BRCS indicated that performance issues were the main 
reason Santiago was not hired.  That Anastasi did not mention Finocchio in his deposition 
testimony does not mean BRCS’s explanation is “‘unworthy of credence,’” Fuentes, 32 
F.3d at 765 (quoting Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d 
Cir. 1992)), especially since the information BRCS maintains Finocchio provided to 
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Anastasi is consistent with the information about Santiago’s performance that Anastasi 
testified he had received from other employees, and which was corroborated by their 
testimony.4  Moreover, although Anastasi did not observe Santiago commit an error 
during the emergency incident, he overheard a “number of people” blame Santiago for it, 
App. 193, an assertion Santiago does not rebut.  As to Jones’s positive views of 
Santiago’s job performance, Santiago has not shown that Anastasi was aware of Jones’s 
perspective at the time of the hiring decision.  Thus, even if Santiago was not at fault for 
the emergency incident and was in fact a good performer, he has offered no evidence to 
indicate that Anastasi knew this at the time Anastasi made his decision or that the 
decision was motivated by discriminatory animus.  See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (“To 
discredit the employer’s proffered reason . . . the plaintiff cannot simply show that the 
employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether 
discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, 
shrewd, prudent, or competent.”); see also Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 
557, 559 (7th Cir. 1987) (“A reason honestly described but poorly founded is not a 
pretext, as that term is used in the law of discrimination.”).   
Third, the composition of BRCS’s work force undercuts Santiago’s assertion that 
he was not hired based on his age or race.  Of the ten employees BRCS hired, eight were 
                                                 
4 For example, Gougler testified that Santiago had “issues [and] flaws,” App. 271, 
including a failure to master the SSA building’s fire alarm system, and that he heard from 
multiple sources that Jones had to assist Santiago with his duties because Santiago was 
unable to complete them himself.  Casey testified that he frequently had to assist Santiago 
because he was unable to master the computer systems.   
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over the age of forty, including Santiago’s older brother, Angel, who was seventy-nine.  
Similarly, while Santiago maintains that a white employee, Joseph Dingler, took over his 
role, he concedes that Dingler was ultimately replaced by a Hispanic employee.5  These 
facts undermine the assertion that BRCS’s decision was motivated by Santiago’s age or 
race.6  See Ansell v. Green Acres Contracting Co., Inc., 347 F.3d 515, 524 (3d Cir. 2003).  
Santiago has thus failed to show that a reasonable juror would find BRCS’s 
reasons for not hiring him are “so plainly wrong” that they could not have been the real 
reasons, and so he has failed to establish pretext.  See Keller, 130 F.3d at 1109. 
B 
Santiago’s reliance on the subordinate bias theory of discrimination also does not 
provide him a basis for relief.  Under this theory, an employer may be liable for 
discrimination claims when an unbiased decision-maker is influenced by a biased 
                                                 
5 To the extent only white EEC operators were promoted to managerial positions, 
Santiago has not shown that these operators were unqualified or promoted at the expense 
of better qualified members of the protected class, and absent such proof, we will not 
second-guess these business decisions.  See Brewer, 72 F.3d at 332. 
6 Santiago also argues that under the mixed-motive theory of discrimination, there 
is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether race was a motivating factor in 
BRCS’s decision not to hire him.  Under the mixed-motive theory, as opposed to the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the key question “is not whether 
discrimination played the dispositive role [in the adverse employment decision] but 
merely whether it played a motivating part.”  Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).  To succeed on such a claim, the plaintiff 
must produce “evidence sufficient to allow the jury to find that the decision makers 
placed substantial negative reliance on . . . race in reaching” the adverse job decision.  
Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 183 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  For the reasons set forth in the text, we conclude that Santiago has failed to 
show that race in any way motivated the decision not to hire him.  
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managerial employee.7  See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 562 U.S. 411, 420-21 (2011).  
To prevail on this theory, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the managerial employee 
performed an act motivated by discriminatory animus that was intended to cause, and was 
in fact the proximate cause of, an adverse employment action.  Id. at 422.  In this context, 
proximate cause is a cause that bears “a direct and substantial relation” to the adverse 
hiring decision.  McKenna v. City of Phila., 649 F.3d 171, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Santiago argues that Casey’s alleged anti-Hispanic bias caused Casey to provide 
negative information to Anastasi, which led Anastasi not to hire Santiago.  Santiago has 
failed to demonstrate, however, that Casey’s statements to Anastasi were the proximate 
cause of the decision not to hire him.  Anastasi testified that Casey’s input did “[n]ot 
really” have an impact on the decision, App. 194, and solidified it only “[a] little bit,” 
App. 195.  Accordingly, the subordinate bias theory is inapplicable here. 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court granting 
summary judgment for BRCS. 
                                                 
7 Santiago’s claim that Casey was the decision-maker is not supported by the 
record, which makes clear that Anastasi was the decision-maker, and merely asked Casey 
for his views about his fellow employees. 
